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Book Reviews
F)RAuDuLENT CONVEYANcES
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Revised

Edition. By Garrard Glenn. New York. Baker, Voorhis
& Co., 1940. 2 Volumes. Pp. xxxi, 1284. $17.50.
Nearly three and one half centuries ago the great Lord
Coke was deploring the fact that "fraud and deceit abound
in these days more than in former times"-crescit in orbe
dolus.1 The subject-matter of this modern treatise is
therefore anything but novel. And that the author would
be the last to deny, for his very thesis holds that the
fraudulent conveyance has remained fundamentally unchanged since the time of Coke and the preference since
Lord Mansfield. Indeed it is this continuity of principle
with which he so skillfully binds together several centuries
of cases into a pattern otherwise meaningless. From
Twyne's Case of 1601 to the Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co. decision2 of 1939 is a far cry. Yet the reader reaches
the epilogue reserved for the latter without having experienced the slightest logical discomfort.
This, of course, is a tribute to Mr. Glenn's genius for
synthesis; and therein lies his real contribution to legal
literature. Using as framework a handful of fundamental principles tempered with history and seasoned by experience, he integrates the superficially divergent subjects
of fraudulent conveyance, reputed ownership, and preference into a symmetrical structure. For example, such a
twentieth-century institution as promoters' secret profits
is revealed as merely a fraudulent conveyance in disguise,
while liability on watered stock is shown to be based upon
reputed ownership. The only apparent difference between
ancient and modern is, then, the streamlined, chromiumplated terminology of corporate law and the size of counsel fees. Consequently it is rather surprising to find the
author refusing to hang the apparently kindred device of
unlawful dividends on the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.'
As is to be expected, his "common denominator" system has its limitations. It is his own statement that "this
law book is largely a drag hunt"; and the reader sometimes
wishes that he would not be led so far afield, only to find
that the scent has been lost. For instance, a single short
2Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b (1601).
2 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
' The position of Parke, J., dissenting In Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478,
487, 161 A. 509 (1932).
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chapter shelters the bankrupt stockbroker, the mortgage
trustee, and the bank unlawfully pledging its assets to
secure deposits! If these beasts cannot be adequately fed,
they should be turned out to forage for themselves.
That, however, is merely a defect in construction. The
really inherent limitation of the Glenn approach is that,
in constantly generalizing, it leads to over-simplification.
The law appears unbelievably-perhaps impossibly-symmetrical. Bothersome details have been sloughed off in
the process of integration. The forest tends to obscure
the trees. This fault, however, is not nearly so apparent
here as in the companion book on Liquidation, the reason being, no doubt, that the materials dealt with are considerably more homogeneous. Nevertheless, both may well
be used together, since certain fraudulent conveyance topics-the validity of assignments for creditors is an example
-are developed only in the older work, with cross-references in the newer.
Although the latter appears to have much more practical utility, the practitioner should not, therefore, expect
to find within its covers either encyclopedia or hornbook.
Employing neither the aridly monotonous repetition of
cases characteristic of the one, nor the canned principles
usually offered by the other, the author has steered a middle course. The result is comparable in kind only to that
achieved by Scott's recent treatise on Trusts, being, however, less detailed though more readable. In fact, breadth
of treatment and lucidity of style make this perhaps the
easiest reading of any American law text. Frank discussion of conflicting decisions and of unsettled points is invaluable because of the author's statement of his own reasoned opinion based upon broad experience and sound
scholarship. This is generally accompanied by a criticism
-always courteoeus, usually restrained-of the opposing
view, from which is exempted not even "the aleatory delights of Supreme Court jurisprudence as it has been of
late".
Except as to law review references, which are voluminous, footnotes are selective rather than exhaustive.
And that is to be expected of the product of a truly independent mind. Moreover, eschewing the customary procedure of spreading a thin veneer of recent cases over
those cited in a first edition, he has combed the advance
sheets to provide an unusually large proportion of new
decisions. Several of these, in fact, authoritatively es-

19401

BOOK REVIEWS

tablish rules which were in dispute at the time of the
first edition. And in at least one important instance the
Supreme Court has recently taken a position which had
been stoutly defended by Mr. Glenn in the face of contrary lower court authority.'
Indeed it would be quite unfair to stigmatize as just
another edition such a completely new work as this. First
and most noticeable is the addition of preferences to the
subject-matter of the older volume. This he justifies to
the reader's complete satisfaction by showing, not their
fundamental similarity to fraudulent conveyances (for
the preference is only a "sporting proposition"), but rather
the large number of liquidation situations in which creditors' rights are affected by both devices.
Equally important is the enlargement, both intensive
and extensive, of the old material on fraudulent conveyances and reputed ownership. An expanded historical
treatment of the former adds twenty pages of valuable
original research. Recent cases have suggested the addition of matters ranging from the fraudulent conveyance
as a contempt to collusive foreclosure as a fraudulent conveyance. Indeed the impact of the depression upon morality has produced significant developments in the whole
subject during the nine years since the first edition appeared. No less than fifteen pages are now devoted to
the fraudulent uses of life insurance. The after-acquired
property clause, previously excluded entirely, is now
shown to offer broad possibilities of fraud and preference.
And such commercial devices as the pledge, chattel mortgage, conditional sale, consignment and trust receipt,5
briefly included in the first edition as something of an innovation, have come to merit individual chapters.
Lastly, the year 1938 alone produced three important
developments which would render any older text obsolete.
The decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,' of course, has
its application in this as in other fields. Of the greatest
significance is Rule 18b of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which dispenses with the necessity of judgment
as a prerequisite to avoiding a fraudulent conveyance in
the Federal courts. Abolishing a requirement which they
have always imposed regardless of state law, the new rule
'Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931).
s Interestingly enough, the first reported use of this expression was by
the Maryland Court of Appeals. Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md. 59 (1877).
0 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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aligns the Federal practice with that under the Uniform
Act and other state statutes reaching the same result.,
Undoubtedly this second edition has its chief raison
d'etre, however, in the many far-reaching changes in the
law of fraudulent conveyances and preferences affected
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1938. For instance, the trustee's suit to set aside a conveyance now requires a full
chapter because of such innovations as the incorporation
into the new statute of many features of the Uniform Act,
and the extension of his power of avoidance for the first
time to corporate reorganization. Other changes could
be detailed without number. Suffice it to say that the
discussion appears generally complete. Of course there
are gaps, as already pointed out; but only encyclopedic
treatment is proof against that. Thus the chapter on Preference by Legal Lien slurs over the great conflict as to
whether an adjudication under the old Act automatically discharged a lien against the whole world, irrespective of any
action by the trustee. This has been settled in the negative by the Supreme Court s since the book's appearance.
On the other hand, the Maryland lawyer should be
pleased to find an outline of the debate currently raging
over the effect of the new Section 60a upon the assignment
of accounts receivable. Local interest arises from the author's conclusion that, in a state such as this, where the
first of several assignees to notify the obligor prevails, 9
the assignment may become voidable as a preference.1" If
approved by the courts, this result will cripple account
financing by banks and credit companies, since they cannot afford to give notice.
Such a random example serves to underline the significance of recent developments in the field of creditors'
rights. True, they will be brought up to date by pocket
supplements to the encyclopedias and bankruptcy manuals.
And that may satisfy some. But to the lawyer who practices on the basis of reason and principle the present work
will remain a classic long after its citations are outmoded.
DAVID

R. OwEN*

Although Maryland adopted the Uniform Act in 1920, Md. Code (1924)
Art. 39B, Secs. 1-14, a predecessor statute was the first in the country to
abolish the need for judgment. Md. Laws 1835, Ch. 380.
8
Fischer v. Pauline Oil & Gas Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 535 (U. S. 1940).
0 Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 72 A. 407 (1909).
10 Contra: Articles in (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 538; and (1939) 26 Va. L.

Rev. 168.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar.
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COMPILATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES.

By Robert E. Coughlan, Jr. Baltimore. A. W. Zimmer,
1939. Pp. xvii, 243. $3.50.
There has been an amazingly small number of Workmen's Compensation cases decided by the Maryland Court
of Appeals (171) when it is considered that the Act was
passed originally over 25 years ago. And yet the busy
practitioner, particularly if he does not handle many Workmen's Compensation cases, has been until now hard put
to locate a point of Maryland law under the Compensation Act. (Geppert's Index, which is useful in its field,
was compiled in 1936, and has never been revised). More
importantly, even when so located it is difficult for him to
carry, either mentally or physically, a complete picture
of the case law of Maryland. Mr. Coughlan has provided
a very useful remedy for this two fold problem of lack
of an adequate digest and understandable general unfamiliarity with the cases in this specialized branch of the
law. His digest of Workmen's Compensation cases is well
done, carefully and faithfully handled, and complete
through Volume 175 Maryland. It can be heartily recommended: to the specialist as a convenient handbook to assist the memory; to the barrister who appears infrequently,
as an invaluable primary source of our compensation law;
and to the student as a substitute for an otherwise extremely meagre idea of the raison d'etre of the Compensation
Act, since he has in all probability not been offered more
than the briefest of sketches of this subject at law school.
A merited criticism is that the index is prepared more
on the lines of indices to other Maryland law books, rather
than on a "common sense" basis. Although it may well
be said that such "common sense" indices are not always
either sensible or common, yet on the whole they tend to
greater speed and accuracy than a general index following only very broad titles. But the index is complete, and
is more thoroughly understood with recurring use.
The cases are numbered, digested chronologically, and
both the Maryland and Atlantic citations are given. It is
to be hoped that Mr. Coughlan will keep his book down to
date, and that while so doing he will broaden the index
base as far as consonant with his obvious plan to provide
a conveniently small handbook of compensation cases.
J. NICHOLAS SHRIVER, JR.*
* Member of the Baltimore City Bar.
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LOOK AT THE LAw. By Percival E. Jackson. New York.
E. P. Dutton and Co., 1940. Pp. 377. $2.75.

On first glancing at this book, its title, and its table of
contents, one easily gets the impression that it is but another journalistic expos6 of the law and the lawyers, and
the many foibles thereof. Reading of it, however, leads
to the refreshing discovery that it is an intelligent and
well-balanced appraisal of the short-comings of our calling. While all the stock examples of the law's defects are
paraded in proper place, yet this is done dignifiedly, not
so as to vilify, but rather to inquire why they are and
what can be done about it.
The author's essential thesis is that the defects in the
law are primarily to be blamed on the layman-that lay
citizens are responsible, either for perpetrating many of
the oddities of the law, or for tolerating the continuance
of the others. This is a point desirable to be made-particularly in the face of the frequent reprinting in the daily
press of tables of eccentric laws in force in different parts
of the country. It would be a safe guess that nine-tenths
of them can be traced to laymen or to lay pressure groups
which engineered them and/or opposed their elimination.
After an introductory chapter, there come ten, each
devoted to a typical layman's complaint about the law.
These are that there is too much law, that it is uncertain,
too rigid, too technical, hypocritical, too slow, too expensive, that lawyers are dishonest, judges corrupt, and witnesses liars. The final three chapters are devoted to the
remedy for it all. The author qualifies himself as competent to write as he does by the wealth of detail he has
marshalled. Accurate references to many of the phenomena--old and new-of the legal scene show the breadth
of his reading. Many of the obscure technicalities of our
criminal, divorce, and other branches of law are drawn on;
at the same time up-to-the-minute references are made to
the workings of the American Law Institute, the bar associations, and other organizations active in making over
the legal scene.
Many legal anecdotes are included. The venerable one1
about the crossing watchman and the unlighted lantern
is streamlined by having the watchman-witness volunteer,
at the end of his cross-examination, that the lantern was
not lighted. Another one-not so familiar, perhaps, but
P. 314.
P. 217.
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amusing-could have been used in this issue of the REVIEW,
in the leading article on Court of Appeals statistics, with
particular reference to the reversal percentages of the trial
judges,3 had not the authors thereof tactfully refrained
from disclosing the individual judges' figures by name.
This anecdote-obviously one not emanating from
Maryland-concerns the trial judge with the notoriously
poor "batting average" in his appellate courts. Once, on
appeal from him, appellant's counsel opened his argument
thus: "This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice
X." An appellate judge interrupted him: "Yes, counsellor, and what is your second ground for appeal."
It should be emphasized, however, that the book is no
mere collection of anecdotes and examples. These are
present, but not merely for the purpose of being told. They
are used well to make their points. The author not only
collected much relevant material, but showed real insight
in making use of it.
This is a valuable and useful book, and one which reads
easily. It should be read both by lawyers and civic-minded
laymen. For the former it will be a good antidote for any
feeling of complacency about the perfection of the law.
At the same time, reading of it by laymen will lead to a
more intelligent understanding on their part of the law's
defects which so frequently are found irritating.
'At

pp. 355-36 of this issue of the REvnhw.

